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Applied  econometric  work  takes  a  superficial  approach  to  causality.  Understanding 
economic affairs, making good policy decisions, and progress in the economic discipline 
depend  on  our  ability  to  infer  causal  relations  from  data.  We  review  the  dominant 
approaches to causality in econometrics, and suggest why they fail to give good results. 
We feel the problem cannot be solved by traditional tools, and requires some out-of-the-
box thinking. Potentially promising approaches to solutions are discussed. 
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The Cowles Commission had a clear approach to causality in econometric models. Causal 
chains were to be specified in advance of modeling, on the basis of theoretical considerations. 
The  econometrician  specified  the  exogenous  and  endogenous  variables,  and  put  in  zero 
restrictions when theory indicated no role for a particular variable in a structural equation. 
This  approach  did  not  succeed  for  several  reasons.  General  equilibrium  suggests  that 
everything causes everything else, and so theory does not provide an adequate guide to model 
specification. Thus, zero restrictions and exogeneity assumptions were made on pragmatic 
grounds. However, substantial conflicts and differences of opinions arose on these issues, 
which  could  not  be  resolved  either  empirically  or  theoretically.  Large  forecast  errors  in 
econometric models following the oil crisis in the 70‟s also cast a cloud of suspicion on these 
conventional methodologies. Keuzenkamp (2000) provides a history, further references, and a 
critical evaluation of a number of new methodologies, which have since been developed. Our 
focus will be on the use of regression models to establish causal relationships.  
 
Most current econometric texts either make no mention of causality, or else contain a brief 
and superficial discussion. Establishing causality is often a central concern in many papers in 
applied  econometrics.  Differentiating  between  causes  and  effects  of  growth,  poverty 
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reduction, inflation, etc. is of crucial importance to crafting suitable policy and developing an 
understanding of the world we live in. Due to lack of appropriate training, many published 
articles display very poor understanding of the evidence required to support causal claims. 
Freedman (2005) discusses numerous articles which use regression analysis, and shows how 
causality claims central to these articles reduce to claims based on observed correlations in 
non-experimental data. Even though the ideas that „correlation does not prove causation‟ and 
that  „Granger-Causality  is  not  equivalent  to  causality‟  are  well-known  and  oft-repeated, 
authors nonetheless continue to rely on these tools to establish and validate causality claims. 
Freedman (1991) has argued that discovering causal relations requires more hard work than 
mere statistical analysis. We will argue that these problems are compounded in econometric 
analysis.  It  is  essential  to  learn  about  causal  chains.  Economic  theory  gives  us  some, 
imperfect, guidance on this matter. Where the causal chains are clear, regressions are useful in 
assessing  the  quantitative  strength  of  the  causal  effect.  A  discovery  of  surprising  or 
unexpectedly  strong  correlations  can  lead  us  to  interesting  hypotheses  about  causal 
mechanisms. While regressions can be useful tools as part of exploratory causal analysis, they 
are  not  adequate  for  confirmation  of  causal  mechanisms,  for  reasons  to  be  discussed. 
Establishing  causality  will  usually  requiring  going  outside  the  range  of  conventional 
econometric techniques. Regression analysis may point the way, and may serve as part of the 
evidence for a causal mechanism, but establishing causality will require more broadly based 
evidence from different types of sources, and more attention to the structure of the real world 
mechanisms, which generate the data.  
 
2. CARICATURE OF A TYPICAL ECONOMETRIC ARGUMENT  
 
Figure  2.1  below  plots  the  variables  for  all  countries  for  which  World  Bank  provides 
information on both variables in 1990. The graph shows the strong positive relation between 
Life Expectancy (LE) and log of number of newspapers published per 1000 people (LN). The 
regression of LE on LN has R
2 = 0.81, and SER=5.2 (standard errors are given in parentheses) 
LE= 45.0 +  5.48 LN+  
   (1.2)  (0.3)   
LN is highly significant. The picture itself shows a clear and strong relationship,  and the 
formal statistics does not really add much to the information displayed in the plot. The issue 
is: how to interpret this relationship. 
 
Suppose someone  were to  argue that the significant  t-statistic on  LN proves  that reading 
newspapers  leads  to  longer  lives,  and  argues  that  developing  countries  should  focus  on 
publishing more newspapers as  a means  for improving life expectancies.  Surely, such an 
argument would be greeted with laughter. If this argument was published in a journal, we 
would be concerned about the sloppy standards of refereeing and editorship. Nonetheless, 
arguments equivalent in logical structure to this one are routinely published in respectable 
journals. For example, on the basis of essentially equivalent data (actually, weaker data) Lynn 
and VanHanen (2002) argue at book length that IQ causes GNP growth. Volken (2003) has 
written a rebuttal using careful and detailed statistical analysis – the seriousness with which 
such  arguments  are  taken  is  another  indication  of  fundamental  problems  with  our 
understanding of causation. In “Why we learn nothing from regressing economic growth on 
government policies,” Rodrik (2005) has pointed out why causal claims regarding effects of 
policy on the basis of cross country regressions are not supported by the correlations, and 
cited several papers making such invalid claims. Rodrik and Rodrigues (2001) analyze three 
influential and highly cited papers, which argue that openness in trade leads to higher growth 
rates, and point out errors in the analysis, which invalidate the causal conclusion. Similarly, Zaman-Causal Relations via Econometrics  
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Friedman  (2005) has  also  cited elementary mistakes  about  causation  in influential  papers 
published in leading journals in social sciences. These sources provide substantial evidence 
that cavalier treatment of causality leads to serious errors in numerous articles, even by the 
best authors publishing in the leading journals. 
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Some argue that multiple regression can solve the problem of significance of  LN (log of 
Newspapers per 1000) in the regression above. The problem arises only because LN proxies 
for other important variables. This means that including the relevant variables will eliminate 
the significance of others. We tried this by including all health relevant variables for which 
data  was  available  in  sufficient  quantities  in  the  World  Bank  data  base.  This  led  to  the 
following regression, with R
2 = 0.74, and SER = 3.8 : 
LE = 57.2 +   6.0 LN –  0.7 LHB +  0.08 ImpSan –  0.04 ImpWat +  4.8 LPhys +  
   (8.9) (2.7)  (2.8)  (0.06)  (0.16)  (2.6)   
 
Here,  LHB  and  LPhys  are  logs  of  Hospital  Beds  and  Physicians  per  1000  population 
respectively,  while  ImpSan  and  ImpWat  measure  improvements  in  sanitation  and  water 
supply. LN remains the only variable, which is significant at 95% level.  Interestingly, its 
coefficient also remains stable despite the addition of several variables. All variables other 
than LN are insignificant. It appears likely that there is a complex set of factors related to the 
process of development, which all affect Life Expectancy. Newspapers per 1000 provides a 
better measure of this complex than other single or groups of variables and hence appears 
significant. No amount of regression tricks will enable us to disentangle the causal complex, 
without studying the actual structure of real world variables, which directly impact on life 
expectancy – this is the process of expending “shoe leather” which Friedman (1991) has 
described  as  essential  to  the  discovery  of  causality.  We  will  later  provide  additional 
arguments why the strategy of variable addition is likely to fail as a tool for discovering 
causal relations. 
 
Typical authors and textbooks remain confused about these issues despite the fact that several 
authors have clearly differentiated between correlation and causation. Problems arising from 
confusing  the  two  have  been  explicated  in  many  papers  ranging  from  the  deep  and International Econometric Review (IER) 
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sophisticated theoretical exposition of Engle et al. (1984) to the lucid  textbook clarity of 
Freedman  et  al.  (2007),  and  the  practical  and  empirical  Rodrik  (2005).  Freedman  (2005) 
discusses  the  very  first  paper  on  multiple  regression  by  Yule,  published  in  1899.  Yule 
regressed percent change in Pauperism on Percent change in Outrelief ratio (outside vs inside 
the poorhouse–the policy debate was on the “new poor law” which made in-relief mandatory). 
The unit of analysis was the “union,” a clump of about 25 parishes. These were the bodies 
that  administered  relief.  Multiple  regression  was  used  to  control  for  several  possible 
confounders.  Yule  came  to  the  conclusion  that  increases  in  in-relief  provisions  lead  to 
increases in the number who declare themselves poor. However, in a footnote, Yule writes 
that “strictly speaking, for „due to‟ read associated with.” If this footnote is taken seriously, 
then the paper says nothing of relevance to the real world, and the policy conclusion drawn is 
meaningless.  Countless  instances  of  similar  strategies  can  be  pointed  out  in  currently 
published papers. The text of the analysis makes the usual academic disclaimers and points 
out  difficulties  with  data,  and  non-equivalence  of  Granger  causality  and  our  common 
understanding of causality. All these caveats are forgotten in the conclusions section which 
makes causal claims on the basis of regressions and policy recommendations on the basis of 
these causality claims. 
 
The point of this discussion is that there are certain aspects of observational  data, which 
simply  cannot  be  assessed  or  analyzed  by  any  econometric  technique,  whether  crude  or 
sophisticated. This is even at the simple level of assessing whether a correlation is genuine or 
spurious.  Causal  mechanisms  require  an  even  deeper  knowledge  of  structure  than  simple 
correlations. Recently, Banerjee and Duflo (2002, 2004, 2007) and others have systematically 
resorted to large scale randomized experiments for a number of microeconomic propositions, 
with good results. Similarly, behavioral and experimental economists have started generating 
and  gathering  data  on  actual  behavior  in  controlled  situations.  These  are  promising 
developments since both utilize experimental data, which is vastly superior to observational 
data in helping to reveal causal mechanisms. 
 
3. EMPIRICAL FAILURE OF REGRESSION MODELS 
 
Starting from the inauspicious beginning by Yule
1, more than a hundred years of regressions 
have  failed  to  yield  a  single  demonstrable  and  solid  successful  discovery  of  a  causal 
relationship. Magnus (1999) writes  about econometric tests of economic theories that “we 
invited readers to name a published paper that … significantly changed the way economists 
think about some economic proposition.” Total lack of response to this challenge suggests 
that it is time to step back and rethink strategy. In a talk on the 100th anniversary of the first 
published  regression  by  Yule,  Freedman  (1997:113)  writes:  “For  nearly  a  century, 
investigators in the social sciences have used regression models to deduce cause-and-effect 
relationships  from  patterns  of  association.  …  .  In  my  view,  this  enterprise  has  not  been 
successful.”  For  nearly  every  posited  causal  mechanism  in  economic  theory,  there  are 
econometric papers on both sides of the issue. A widely believed causal claim is that growth 
of the money stock causes inflation. However, in a careful study based on the most recent 
methodological advances, Hendry and Ericsson (1991) dispute this claim of Friedman and 
argue that the causality runs in the other direction. The core of the rejoinder by Friedman is 
simply that complex econometric analyses often fail in the real world; in support of this, he 
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cites personal experience rather than analytical or theoretical arguments. The consumption 
function introduced by Keynes is at the heart of macroeconomics, and has been intensively 
studied. Despite its central importance and extensive research, there is a bewildering variety 
of variables with claims to be causes of consumption, all supported by econometric analysis. 
Furthermore, the best available models routinely fail; Thomas (1993:284) writes that “Perhaps 
the most worrying aspect of empirical work on aggregate consumption is the regularity with 
which  apparently  established  equations  break  down  when  faced  with  new  data.  This  has 
happened repeatedly in the UK since the 1970s. … the reader may be forgiven for wondering 
whether  econometricians  will  ever  reach  the  stage  where  even  in  the  short  run  their 
consumption equations survive confrontation with new data.” 
 
Why is there lack of clarity about an issue of such fundamental importance, which is central 
to our tasks as econometricians and economists? Hoover (2006) discusses the history of a 
tension and paradox originating with Hume, which continues to this day in economic practice. 
One the one hand, Hume recognizes the central importance of causality to the conduct of 
economic policy. On the other hand, Hume notes that only timing and correlations can be 
observed,  and  genuine  causal  relations  are  unobservable.  This  tension  is  reflected  in 
econometrics  in  the  frequency  with  which  causation  is  discussed  in  the  policy 
recommendations and implications section, and correlations and timings equated to causality 
in the econometric analysis. 
 
An additional factor in the cavalier treatment of causality in econometrics is identified by 
Blaug (1998): “Economics as taught in graduate schools has become increasingly preoccupied 
with formal technique to the exclusion of studying real-world problems and issues.” Inertia 
and  momentum  of  existing  methodologies,  which  have  acquired  respectability  and 
mechanisms in place for promotions and publication, are certainly to blame. For example, 
Hey (1997) summed up his experience of ten years of editorship of the Economic Journal by 
noting  the  overwhelming  predominance  of  formal  mathematical  models  of  economic 
problems: “Many of the submissions do not appear to be written in order to further economic 
knowledge. … few economists ask themselves what are the crucial economic problems facing 
society. If they did so, they might well produce more relevant material.” Articles focused on 
econometric  techniques  alone,  with  data  and  real-world  applications  serving  merely  as 
framework  and  window  dressing  for  demonstration  of  mathematics  and/or  clever  new 
statistical techniques are easier to write, more easily publishable, and more prestigious, then 
marshalling of evidence from a variety of clues pieced together via less formal arguments 
often required for genuine causal analysis. Discussing several cases of successful discovery of 
causal relations, Freedman (2008) has emphasized the role of qualitative and informal insights 
in the process. 
 
Discovering causal laws is difficult, and involves substantial effort. It is nonetheless possible, 
and  numerous  successes  are  documented  by  Freedman  et  al.  (2007),  including  the 
effectiveness of Salk‟s polio vaccine. The relation between smoking and cancer is famous for 
having been established purely on a statistical basis. To illustrate the subtle and complex 
issues, which must be resolved to distinguish between correlation and causation, note that the 
suggestion that a genetic factor might dispose one towards both smoking and cancer was 
disproven by looking at cancer rates among identical twins with discordant smoking habits. 
Along with numerous successes, failures and errors in discovering causality are also common. 
Freedman  et  al.  (2007)  discuss  many  cases  in  which  observational  studies  led  to  wrong 
conclusions, sometimes with disastrous consequences. In the next section, we argue that while International Econometric Review (IER) 
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statisticians can sometimes arrive at the truth, special features of econometric methodology 
make this outcome unlikely for econometricians.  
 
4. STRATEGIES OF SURRENDER 
 
Hume  pointed  out  that  only  correlations  and  timing  are  observable,  while  causality  is 
inherently unobservable. This has led some to argue that we can get by without assessing 
causal relations; worse, some have argued that, because it is fundamentally unobservable, it is 
a  pre-scientific  notion  and  should  be  discarded.  Prominent  among  these  what  one  of  the 
founders of statistics, Pearson (1911) who writes that “Beyond such discarded fundamental as 
„matter‟ and „force‟ lies still another fetish … namely, the category of cause and effect.” 
Hoover (2004) writes that „causal language in economics virtually collapsed between 1950 
and  about  1990‟.  Lack  of  emphasis  on  causality  is  easily  demonstrated  by  some  quotes 
collected in Pearl (2000:341): 
 
  The Encylopedia of Statistical Science devotes twelve pages to correlation, but only 
two to causation, and spends one of these pages demonstrated that the two are not 
equivalent. 
 
  Philip Dawid, the editor of Biometrika, admits that “Causal inference is on of the most 
important, most subtle, and most neglected of all the problems of statistics.” [emphasis 
mine] 
 
  Terry Speed, a former president of the Biometric Society, declares: “Considerations of 
causality should be treated as they always have been in statistics: preferably not at all 
but, if necessary, with very great care. 
 
  Cox  and  Wermuth  (1996)  in  their  recent  text Multivariate  Dependencies:  Models, 
Analysis and Interpretation, write that “We did not in this book use the words causal 
or causality …” 
 
We  illustrate  why  we  cannot  get  by  without  an  understanding  of  causality  by  a  simple 
example. Barro (1997) discovered that education affects development with about a 10 year 
lag, while other variables he considered were not significant. This implies that the single most 
significant  component  of  a  development  strategy  is  investment  on  education.  While  this 
position has substantial intuitive appeal, we wish to consider whether the statistical evidence 
supports  a  causal  link  between  education  and  development.  The  evidence  is  logically 
equivalent to the evidence supporting the link between newspapers and longevity. To decide 
on whether or not we should invest heavily in education as a means to promote development, 
it is crucial to distinguish between correlation and causation. If we consider this to be mere 
correlation  and  fail  to  invest  in  education,  we  could  be  guilty  of  losing  a  tremendous 
opportunity for improving lives of large numbers of people. Mistaking a correlation for a 
causal relation would lead to the opposite mistake, akin to investing heavily in newspaper 
production  as  a  means  for  prolonging  life.  We  cannot  afford  to  be  agnostic  about  the 
difference between correlations and causation. 
 
In wake of disenchantment with econometrics following widespread forecast failures in the 
70‟s, schools of thought which place even greater emphasis on theory and even less on data 
have emerged. The real business cycle (RBC) school of thought in macroeconomics uses data 
to “calibrate” theoretical models – that is numerical magnitudes not specified in the theory are Zaman-Causal Relations via Econometrics  
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measured  by  using  elementary  descriptive  statistics  of  the  data;  see  Faust  and  Whiteman 
(1997). The question of using data to assess theory and revise postulated causal mechanisms 
does not arise in this approach.  
 
The Lucas critique suggested that failure of macroeconomic models results from insufficient 
attention to theory. To remedy this, one should use the data to estimate unobservables which 
economic  theory  posits  (termed  „deep  parameters‟),  instead  of  directly  estimating 
relationships  among  observables.  Like  the  Cowles  Commission  approach,  all  of  these 
strategies give up on the possibility of learning about causal mechanisms from the data. To a 
lesser extent, they also give up on the possibility of learning about the structure, functional 
forms, and nature of stochastic relations among the variables from the data. To be fair, gross 
conflicts between observations and theoretical predictions can take place, and have led to 
revisions of theory, and even of causal chains. Similarly, modifications of functional forms 
and of specifications for errors can and do take place routinely in course of estimation of 
regression models. However, all of these activities fall outside the purview of econometric 
theory (and are done in the basement, out of sight of the high priests who condemn such 
activities, in the metaphor of Leamer, 1983).  
 
With a few exceptions to be discussed later, econometric theory does not formally allow for 
learning from data about many crucial aspects of the real world. If we had excellent economic 
theory, which provided a reliable guide to causal and structural mechanisms, then we could 
live  with  this  situation.  Unfortunately,  we  have  compelling  reasons  to  believe  otherwise. 
Current  macroeconomic  textbooks  discuss  the  diverse  opinions  of  numerous  schools  of 
thought; see for example Seven Schools of Macroeconomic Thought by Phelps (1991). Papers 
presented at the AEA Session in 1997 entitled “Is There a Core of Macroeconomics That We 
Should All Believe?” (see Bolch, 1998) highlighted the conflicts over nearly all fundamental 
macroeconomic propositions. In face of such severe conflicts among theorists, it is clear that 
theory does not provide a reliable guide. In such a situation, it is necessary to devise some 
mechanisms to allow us to learn about the world from data. 
 
The substantial and persistent conflicts among theorists have led another school of thought, 
headed by Sims (1980), to the opposite extreme. This school recommends fitting a general 
VAR model to time series data, which treats all variables together as nameless pieces of data, 
and gives no role to theory. In my view, differentiating causality from correlation requires 
some knowledge of structure, and hence the real world quantities measured by the variables 
under study. A purely statistical analysis cannot discover causal effects and hence amounts to 
a strategy of surrender. Nonetheless, such analysis can discover patterns of correlation among 
the  data  as  well  as  timing.  By  far  the  currently  most  popular  approach  to  causality  in 
econometrics is Granger Causality, which substitutes timing and correlations for causality. 
Since such an approach has the potential for learning about causality from the data, we defer a 
discussion to the next section. 
 
5. METHODS FOR DISCOVERING CAUSALITY 
 
Theory does not provide adequate guidance, and we cannot afford to be ignorant, so we must 
use observations and data to learn about causal mechanisms. Aldrich (1989) has argued that 
progress of science is directly related to discovery of causal mechanisms. Hoover (2006) has 
reviewed all extant approaches to causality currently in use in economics and econometrics, 
and also provided a useful categorization and classification. Below we follow an alternative International Econometric Review (IER) 
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scheme, and classify approaches according to the evidence used to justify causal inference. 
This leads to four types of approaches, discussed separately below. 
 
Conformity to Theoretical Specifications: We have discussed different types of approaches 
based on a priori specifications of causal schemes. Here a model, which fits the data and 
conforms to the a priori specification, is taken as evidence of support for the a priori causal 
specifications.  Because  of  the  diverse  and  flexible  classes  of  models  available  to  the 
econometrician, it is  very  easy to  produce  models,  which fit  the data, even for very bad 
theories.  This  is  discussed  in  greater  detail  in  the  next  section.  The  literature  is  full  of 
conflicting theories all of which are able to provide evidence of conformity. This is why such 
methods  have  failed  to  uncover  any  causal  mechanisms  or  resolve  any  theoretical 
controversies.  
 
Stability and Robustness to Specifications: It is sometimes suggested that „robustness‟ is 
the key to causal relationships (for example Leamer, 1983, as well as several other authors). If 
a variable stands out as significant in a lot of different specifications, then this signals a causal 
relationship. In small data sets, robustness may come about purely by accident. For example, 
an economic theory suggests that annual changes in consumption are purely random – the 
consumer plans his  lifetime consumption based on his  evaluation of his  lifetime income. 
Random  shocks  to  his  income can cause random  changes  in  his  plans, but  these are not 
predictable from past data; see Thomas (1991:274-278).  
 
Letting  DCHN  and  DAUS  be  the  annual  change  in  consumption  in  China  and  Australia 
respectively, a regression yields the following results; (R
2 = 0.30, SER = 6.5 E+10) 
DCHN =  1.39E+10 +   7.11 DAUS +  
  (2.65E+10)  (1.97)   
 
   Coefficients  Standard Error  t-stat 
Intercept  5.87E+10  6.60E+10  0.89 
DZA  -2.90  2.81  -1.03 
ARG  -0.43  1.61  -0.27 
AUS  8.44  3.12  2.71 
AUT  -0.59  10.13  -0.06 
BGD  0.30  0.38  0.79 
BEL  -7.42  9.96  -0.75 
BEN  0.95  0.58  1.65 
BOL  -21.50  54.31  -0.40 
BFA  0.30  0.42  0.72 
CMR  -0.01  0.06  -0.11 
CAN  -1.23  2.29  -0.54 
TCD  -0.46  0.36  -1.27 
CHL  0.00  0.01  0.09 
COL  -0.02  0.02  -1.17 
ZAR  -1.82  1.34  -1.36 
CIV  0.08  0.08  0.97 
Table 5.1 Regression of Change in Annual Consumption in China (DCHN) on Annual Consumption for 16 
Countries (WDI three letter country codes). 
 
This regression uses WDI Online data on Final consumption expenditure (constant LCU) for 
China  (CHN)  and  Australia  (AUS)  from  1970  to  2003,  and  suggests  that  changes  in 
Australian  consumption  significantly  affects  the  Chinese,  rejecting  the  economic  theory. 
Differencing eliminates stochastic trends, so this phenomenon is not related to the classic Zaman-Causal Relations via Econometrics  
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“spurious regressions” produced by use of integrated time series. Remarkably, the coefficient 
remains numerically stable and statistically significant even after  we add many additional 
countries to this same regression. We regress DCHN on the consumption of the countries 
listed (three letter codes as per WDI tables). The estimated coefficients and associated  t-
statistics are listed in Table 5.1; only Australia (AUS) is significant, and the coefficient is 
stable (close to what it is in the above regression without the other countries). 
 
Backed by some plausible sounding theory such as imitation of Australian consumer behavior 
by the Chinese, and impressive statistical names like “Extreme Bounds Analysis,” we should 
be able to convince the unsuspecting victim that the robust and reliable relationship cannot be 
due to chance. The ease with which this and similar examples can be produced show that we 
cannot trust purely statistical analyses on observational data sets. Hendry (2000) given many 
other examples based on the idea that „integrated‟ series lead to spurious regressions. Our 
example  above  uses  differenced  series  and  shows  that  spurious  regressions  are  not  just 
confined to integrated series. 
 
Timing of Correlations: Granger causality is the most popular explicit approach to eliciting 
causal  mechanisms  from  the  data.  This  relies  on  evidence  about  timing  of  correlations. 
Asghar (2007) has shown that Granger causality is very sensitive to minor and apparently 
insignificant details of the testing procedure. Causal chains can reverse directions for small 
changes  in  specifications,  time  period  of  data,  variable  transforms,  tests  used  for  model 
selection and lag length selection, etc. Since econometricians routinely experiment with such 
changes, this accounts for the large numbers of conflicting claims about Granger causality, 
which can be found in the literature. A simple reason why timing evidence cannot be trusted 
can be given as follows. Suppose that there is an underlying variable M, which measures 
structural changes, associated with modernization, which reflect in several dimensions in the 
economy. This variable is not directly observed nor easily measurable. Suppose that M leads 
to increases in LN (log of newspapers per 1000) in the short run and increases in LE (life 
expectancy) in the long run. Then the data will show a correlation between LN and LE at a 
later date. This correlation will also be robust to addition of other variables, because it is 
based on real structure. Nonetheless, it cannot be relied upon to reveal causation. Nor can we 
expect  that  multiple  regression  techniques,  or  sophisticated  treatments  via  instrumental 
variables,  will  reveal  the  problem.  Deeper  and  more  sophisticated  arguments  by  Hoover 
(2001) show why we cannot rely on Granger causality to learn about causal mechanisms in 
the context of macroeconomic models. 
 
Patterns  of  Correlations:  No  causal  relation  between  X  and  Y  implies  stochastic 
independence  and  zero  correlation.  Similarly,  all  causal  patterns  between  a  collection  of 
variables  have  implications  for  patterns  of  correlations  which  can  exist  between  these 
variables. Pearl (2000) and associates have worked out methods to infer causal chains from 
the  observed  patterns  of  correlation  in  the  data.  A  handful  of  papers  have  applied  such 
methods in econometrics. See Hoover (2006) for further details and references. So far there 
are no recorded successes for these methods in econometrics. Some reasons for pessimism are 
given  in  Freedman  (2004).  Freedman  (2005,  Chapter  5)  also  provides  a  critique  of  path 
models as a means for discovering causality. 
 
Natural Experiments: Using knowledge of history outside the purely statistical, one can 
isolate episodes and events where changes are clearly not caused by variables under study. 
This  ability  to  isolate  an  uncaused  event  leads  to  the  possibility  of  studying  causes  by 
examining relations, which remain stable through periods of change. This possibility has been International Econometric Review (IER) 
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exploited by a few researchers (for example, Angrist and Krueger, 2001; Hoover, 2001 and 
Asghar,  2007)  to  asses  causality  in  various  econometric  models.  Hendry‟s  methodology 
employs  a  variant  of  this  technique,  and  is  discussed  in  section  7  below.  This  approach 
appears  promising  as  it  inputs  additional  genuine  causal  information  outside  the  purely 
statistical ones into the procedure of econometric inference. Statisticians have been successful 
in  using  natural  experiments  to  isolate  cause  and  effect  from  observational  data.  The 
temptation to overfit, using complex models and equally complex error processes, tends to 
make  it  difficult  for  econometricians  to  learn  from  the  data.  If  this  tendency  could  be 
regulated, this approach should prove fruitful. 
 
6. THE UNDERSTUDIED PROBLEM OF OVERFITTING 
 
The extensive variety of models available to the econometrician as vehicles to expressing a 
theory in concrete forms leads to overfitting data in many ways, and overfitting leads to lack 
of validity for regression models. It is well known that changing the initial regression model 
in response to any aspect of the fit leads to lack of validity of the diagnostic statistics for the 
second model fitted. For example, if we select the best among 20 regressions, one of these 
will be significant at 95% level when all of the regressions are invalid. Jensen (2000) writes 
that 
“However,  this  "dark  side"  of  data  mining  is  still  largely  unknown  to  some 
practitioners, and problems such as overfitting and overestimation of accuracy 
still  arise  in  knowledge  discovery  applications  with  surprising  regularity.  In 
addition, the statistical effects of search can be quite subtle, and they can trip up 
even experienced researchers and practitioners.  
 
Despite the fact that model selection almost always takes place in practice and is known to 
affect the validity of regression statistics of the final model presented, it is nearly universally 
ignored  in  applications.  Contributions  of  a  few  authors  (e.g.  Ashley,  1999)  who  have 
attempted  to  provide  methods  for  adjusting  statistics  to  account  for  the  search  process, 
following the seminal work of Leamer (1983), have been ignored in the literature. 
 
If one has a sufficiently rich class of models to provide a perfect fit to any data set, then this 
class will almost certainly overfit the data, and therefore be almost useless for discovery of 
real world structures. Our contention is that the toolbox of the econometrician is too rich for 
comfort. The full data set for Final Consumption in constant LCU (local currency units) for 
Argentina, taken from WDI online, is pictured in Figure 6.2 below. 
 
Suppose we wish to forecast the value of consumption for 2008. We could just use the last 5 
years of data, which would give almost a perfect fit to a linear model. If we want an even 
more optimistic forecast, a quadratic function could be fitted to the last 10 points of data. If 
the quadratic appears strained, a second order ARMA model will provide similar results while 
hiding the „cooking‟ of the data from a naïve audience. If the error process displays any 
irregularities,  we  could  go  to  ARMA,  ARCH,  GARCH,  or  other  types  of  complex  error 
structures. If a pessimistic forecast is called for, restricting the data to start from 1991 will 
generate them. We can always find some event, such as change of monetary regimes, to 
justify introduction of a structural change, and hence discarding of previous data. This does 
not  begin  to  exhaust  the  bag  of  tricks  at  our  disposal.  For  example,  we  can  take  logs, 
differences, or make other suitable transforms of any or all variables before or during the 
modeling process. Faustman and White (1997) statement about the LSE approach that “one 
brings  to  the  project  a  set  of  tools  that  virtually  guarantees  that  one  can  find  a  model Zaman-Causal Relations via Econometrics  
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satisfying the test criteria on any dataset,” is a valid critique of all econometric approaches to 
modeling. While we can make some intuitive  judgment about  the relative validity of the 
different approaches to forecasting described above, it is disturbing that we have no formal or 
theoretical criteria to guide us regarding this matter. 
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To put the problem in sharper focus, consider the issue of how we could prove correlation 
between two series, which are known a priori to be independent. Since (Granger) causality is 
just correlation with lags, these techniques can also be applied to prove causality between 
independent series. Here is a list of ways, all of which are used routinely by econometricians: 
 
1.  Select the series from among a large set. We found the strong correlation between 
Chinese and Australian consumption by looking at all the correlations in the data set. 
 
2.  Adjust  the  time  period  to  suit.  As  in  the  data  set  above,  by  discarding  different 
segments of the time series, we can change results to suit our tastes. Asghar (2007) 
gives several examples of cases where Granger causality shifts depending on the time 
period chosen. Since outliers have strong effects on Least Squares estimates, omitting 
or including a few observations can have a dramatic effect on standard estimates and 
results. 
 
3.  Use  data  transformations,  such  as  logs,  differences,  percentage  changes,  Box-Cox 
transformations, or whatever fits best – Faust and Whiteman (1997) have aptly called 
some transformations “designer” variables.  
 
4.  Many concepts from economic theory can be creatively interpreted within a fixed data 
set. Wealth, income, consumption, permanent income, interest rate etc. are all flexible 
concepts  and  can  be  matched  to  different  types  of  actual  measures.  We  can  find International Econometric Review (IER) 
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dozens of measures of “openness” for economies, as well as evidence that authors 
searched for the definition which would suit their theses; see Rodriguez and Rodrik 
(2001).  
 
5.  It should be obvious that the use of suitable nonlinear functions would allow a perfect 
fit  between  any  two  variables.  Nonparametric  or  semiparametric  methods  with  a 
suitable collection of orthogonal basis functions systematize this procedure. 
 
6.  As Hendry (2000) has remarked, every model with a complex error process can be 
translated  into  a  model  with  a  simple  error  process  and  complex  dynamics  on 
observables. Thus apparently innocuous “generalization” to  accommodate complex 
error processes can be used to fit arbitrarily complex dynamic models.  
 
7.  Even if all specification issues are settled correctly, there remains a vast choice of 
estimators and test procedures, which, like the Midas touch, can turn data into the gold 
of  a  significant  result.  Sufficient  creativity  in  choosing  instruments  or  appropriate 
moments to match for the generalized method of moments will always lead to the 
desired results. With vast numbers of tests, many with acknowledged low power, one 
can confirm the non-rejection of ones favorite hypothesis by selecting a suitable test. 
 
For example, Baba et al. (1992) succeed in finding a stable money demand equation for M1 in 
USA up to 1980‟s. This time period contains several structural changes labeled “missing 
money” of the 70‟s and the “great velocity decline” of the 80‟s, which had frustrated previous 
attempts. Faust and Whiteman (1997) write that: 
 
Finding such a stable equation and a corresponding economic rationalization is a 
heroic achievement. The question is whether the achievement is testament to the 
ability of the method to uncover important economic regularities. The alternative, 
of  course,  is  that  the  equation  is  testament  to  the  ability  of  talented  and 
imaginative  practitioners  to  generate  a  relation  that  passes  stability  tests, 
regardless of the data. 
 
They  go  on  to  discuss  how  subsequent  failures  of  the  model  suggest  that  the  second 
alternative holds and cast suspicion on the “designer” variables introduced to achieve good fit. 
The best practitioners can and do overfit, and our statistics fail to give us a clue on when this 
happens; this is a problem that needs serious consideration and further study. 
 
7. LESSONS FROM HENDRY’S METHODOLOGY 
 
Leamer (1983) remarked on the fact that the High Priests of econometrics who preach that 
models must be specified a priori undergo a remarkable transformation when they enter the 
computer lab in the basement. In less colorful language, it is virtually impossible to adhere to 
the maxim that regression models cannot be changed in response to the data. In economics, 
models  are  a  dime  a  dozen  while  data  is  precious,  so  even  if  the  first  model  fits  well, 
exploration of fit of other models is carried out (and should be carried out) on the same data 
set. However, none of our statistics for validating and assessing regression models can cope 
with the issue of data-based model selection and change; see Jensen (2000) for a discussion 
and  further  references.  Even  if  the  selection  is  based  on  a  glance  at  the  data  (as  in  the 
regression  fits  to  Argentinian  consumption  data  above),  this  disturbs  the  validity  of  the 
regression statistics which are based on the assumption that the model is “true” independent Zaman-Causal Relations via Econometrics  
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of the data, and before any observations are made. Leamer (1983) called this assumption the 
“Axiom  of  Correct  Specification.”  He  discussed  how  this  is  obviously  false,  since  many 
econometric models simultaneously claim to be the unique true model for the data. At the 
same time, it is fundamental to econometric inference, since all conventional statistics are 
based directly on this assumption and invalid when it fails. 
 
Hendry‟s  (2000) methodology is  the only  one  which  explicitly takes  the econometricians 
search for models into account. It has led to a number of deep insights into the process of 
systematic model search and its consequences, which have yet to be fully assimilated by the 
profession. The fact is the actual methodology utilized by econometricians (including Hendry 
and his followers; see Darnell and Evans, 1990) is much wilder and less subject to rules and 
regulation than the picture presented by Hendry. Even this tame picture overturns numerous 
suppositions  built  into  the  language  used  by  econometricians  to  describe  our  work.  We 
describe a few issues, which arise as an almost immediate consequence of viewing models as 
suitable reductions of the data generating process (DGP). For our present purposes, it suffices 
to consider the DGP as the unique true underlying stochastic process, which generates the 
observed data. 
 
Suppose that the variables (Xt, Yt, Zt) have a trivariate normal distribution and are i.i.d. across 
time for t=1,2,…,T. Then the conditional distribution of X given (Y, Z) will be stable across 
time, and an econometrician who posits that X is determined by Y and Z will receive a perfect 
confirmation for his theory. However, the conditional distribution of Y given (X, Z) is also 
perfectly stable and the theory that X determines Y will also be confirmed by the data. In this 
situation, there are a large number of a priori theories, all of which will be correct, true, and 
perfectly compatible with the data. Any two of the variables may be taken as a cause for the 
third. Also, any variable can be taken as a cause for any other, with the third variable being a 
concomitant variable. The third variable Z can also be taken out of the picture by considering 
the marginal distribution of the first two (X, Y). This is also a perfectly valid reduction of the 
DGP, and yields a true bivariate model.  
   
This existence of several true models is an embarrassment and does not correspond to the 
picture that econometricians have of the modeling process.  
  Y = a X + r   (7.1) 
  Y = b X + c Z + s   (7.2) 
In the above framework, (7.1) and (7.2) are both valid reductions of the DGP. It does not 
make  sense  to  think  of  the  first  model  as  misspecified  (as  per  standard  econometric 
terminology), and to think that estimates of “a” are biased because of the missing variable Z. 
This shows how difficult it would be to arrive at causal relations simply on the basis that the 
data conform to an a priori specification. Hendry proposes to solve the problem of multiple 
true models by using the concept of “variance encompassing” – the second model (7.2) is to 
be preferred because its residual will have smaller variance. In practical situations, the choice 
between (7.1) and  (7.2)  cannot  be made on theoretical  grounds.  Missing observations,  or 
noisy data for Z would lead to (7.1) being a preferred model. In forecasting situations, if Z 
cannot be accurately forecast, while X can be, (7.1) could be the preferred forecasting model.  
 
Calculating  the  effects  of  interventions  requires  knowledge  of  causal  mechanisms.  In  a 
smoothly functioning world with (X, Y, Z) as described above, causal mechanisms could not 
be discovered by observations. All possible causal relationships would consistent with the 
observations.  Much  as  in  the  concept  of  natural  experiments,  Hendry  proposes  to  use 
structural changes to find out about causal relations in this setup. If X is determined by Y, International Econometric Review (IER) 
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without reference to Z, then Y can be taken as the cause of X. If the marginal distribution of Z 
remains stable, the regression of Y and X and X on Y will both be stable relationships. If there 
is structural change and the distribution of Z shifts, then the distribution of X given Y will 
remains stable, while that of Y given X will shift and display instability. From this, we should 
be able to see that Y causes X and not the other way around. The fundamental idea appears 
sound – among a set of correlations, artificial ones will break down, and structural ones will 
persist through shakeups. Can the idea be implemented, and lead to revelations of structural 
relationships? Only a few researchers have used this approach, and we do not have enough 
evidence or experience to judge this as yet. For example, Hendry and Ericsson (1991) used 
this  approach  to  argue  that  causation  runs  from  prices  to  money,  reversing  the  standard 
analysis. Subsequent failure of predictive validity of their 1991 model casts some doubt on 
their results, however. 
 
Another major insight that results from taking model choice explicitly into account, and doing 
it in the systematic manner suggested by Hendry, is the realization that both models and 
residuals are simultaneously constructed by the econometrician. If valid models are required 
to have i.i.d. residuals, for example, then the modeling process will continue until residuals 
possessing  such  properties  are  obtained.  The  realization  has  led  Hendry  to  change 
terminology for tests of residuals to “indices of conformity.” Furthermore, the large collection 
of tools at our disposal virtually guarantees that we can find a model with satisfactory indices 
of  conformity  for  any  dataset,  regardless  of  whether  the  underlying  process  satisfies  the 
criteria  (as  noted  by  Hendry,  1993:24).  This  problem  of  overfitting  plagues  all  areas  of 
econometrics,  and  prevents  the  realization  of  the  potential  of  a  number  of  promising 
approaches, some of which have been mentioned earlier. 
 
8. STRATEGIES FOR SUCCESS 
 
In  the  process  of  translating  a  theory  into  implications  about  data,  so  many  auxiliary 
assumptions are made that all contact with reality is lost. Any conflict can be resolved by 
adjusting the auxiliary assumptions. For example, suppose we want to learn if a production 
process  satisfies  diminishing,  constant,  or  increasing  returns  to  scale.  The  issue  is  of 
substantial significance from the point of view of theory. In carrying out the test, we assume a 
particular form of a production function, a particular way in which stochastic errors enter, and 
particular ways to aggregate and measure factors of production. The result of the test has no 
credibility, because we do not know what we are rejecting or accepting: the theory, or the 
auxiliary assumptions,  or the ingenuity of the econometrician. This  is why Keuzenkamps 
(2000) quotes Spanos‟ that „no economic theory was ever abandoned because it was rejected 
by some empirical econometric test.‟  
 
Leamer (1978) has described the practice of econometricians as being a “specification search” 
– we look for a regression model, which conforms to the theory and also to the data. He thinks 
that this may be a fruitful task as an exploratory device, but taking this explicitly into account 
would substantially improve methodology. He has described the different types of devices, 
which  could  be  used  to  produce  models,  which  validate  and  confirm  one‟s  favorite 
econometric  theory.  First,  one  has  to  choose  a  set  of  observations,  which  measures  a 
theoretical concept or category. For example, Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001) discuss how there 
is substantial flexibility in the choice of an index to measure the loose concept of “openness to 
trade.”  The  choice  of  authors  they  cite  appears  to  be  guided  by  the  need  to  produce  a 
significant variable, which supports the theory that free trade promotes growth. Very often the 
chosen  measure  can  be  given  several  different  interpretations,  many  of  which  would Zaman-Causal Relations via Econometrics  
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contradict the theory under study. In addition, one can choose the data set, by specifying the 
time period, the countries to be studied, etc. These choices may be justified by asserting that 
the theory is more likely to hold over this period and those countries, but is more often done 
in an opportunistic manner. Examples where slight changes in time period, choice of data set, 
functional forms, choices of lag length, modified measures for key variables, etc. significantly 
affect the final result of the analysis abound in the literature – indeed, nearly every analysis is 
of this type. Exploratory analysis of this analysis may have merit in producing interesting 
hypotheses, as Leamer argues, but cannot be used to provide evidence for causality.  
 
As discussed earlier, I am not aware of a single instance where a causal mechanism was 
discovered  by  regression.  In  contrast,  there  are  several  stories  of  successful  discovery  of 
causal mechanisms in other areas; see Freedman (2008). Based on these success stories, I 
would like to offer some suggestions, which may help, improve the situation in the future. 
 
8.1. Seek Confrontations with the Data 
 
Current methodology seeks accommodation of the data, with calibration being an extreme 
example. Instead, we should follow positivist prescriptions: the power of a theory should be 
judged in terms of what observable phenomena it rules out. Theories should be valued for 
sharp  predictions  about  observations,  which  can  be  refuted.  Good  theories  will  be  those, 
which survive confrontations with data. Economics is capable of generating powerful theories 
with strong predictions about what may or may not be observed in the real world. Consider 
for example, the “efficient markets” hypothesis, which says that all profit opportunities are 
exploited. This means that studying past data on Yen-Dollar exchange rates cannot lead one 
to  find  a  pattern  useful  for  future  predictions  of  this  rate.  In  particular,  the  correlations 
between the percentage changes should be zero. In Figure 8.3, the graph of daily percentage 
change  shows  the  (lack)  of  pattern  predicted  by  economic  theory.  Regressions  of  the 
percentage change on lagged values confirm that there is no information in the past values on 
current exchange rate. The relation between theory and data is not mediated by a model of 
uncertain pedigree. 
 
The idea that stock prices reflect the present discounted values of future returns can similarly 
be directly tested – and rejected. The stock prices  are too volatile relative to the present 
discounted values of returns. This anomaly has led to deep examination of other possible 
explanations for determination of stock prices, and many advances in theories.  
 
A  clear  rejection  of  static  Keynesian  consumption  functions  has  led  to  substantial 
improvements  in  our  understanding  of  the  macro  consumption  function.  Similarly,  if 
consumers make consumption plans on the basis of their projections of lifetime income, then 
consumption paths should smooth out income fluctuations. Examination of relative volatility 
of consumption and income streams has led to greater understanding of the nature of the 
consumption  function.  In  general,  conflicts  between  theory  and  data  have  led  to  more 
sophisticated theory and data analysis in econometrics. 
 
Anomalies, which could not be explained by dominant theories, have often played a key role 
in successful discoveries of causal structure, as documented in Freedman (2008). Instead of 
looking for auxiliary assumptions, functional forms, etc. to fit theories to data, we should 
actively seek ways of formulating theories so that they can directly confront data, and be 
capable of refutation by suitable observations. Such an empiricist methodology has a much 
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8.2. Look for Alternative Explanations 
 
A satisfactory fit between the data and any given theory is often the goal of econometric 
analysis.  Examination  of  success  stories  for  discovery  of  causal  relations  shows  how 
important it is to go beyond this step. Having found a good fit, it is necessary to look for 
alternative explanations for the same data. If satisfactory alternative explanations cannot be 
found, this strengthens the case for our current theory, which does fit well. When there are 
other  alternative  explanations,  which  fit  equally  well,  then  we  must  do  “differential 
diagnosis”:  look  for  ways  to  differentiate  between  competing  explanations.  There  are 
numerous cases of how this was done cited in the literature. For example, the idea that there is 
a genetic predisposition to cancer, which also induces smoking, was disproven by the study of 
identical twins with different smoking habits. Active search for competing explanations and 
ways to differentiate between them has been an important element of successful discovery of 
causal mechanisms. The idea of “encompassing” which is one of the cornerstones of the 
Hendry methodology does capture an aspect of this, but this needs to be done more regularly 
and more widely than is current econometric practice. 
 
8.3. Qualitative and Informal Supporting Evidence 
 
This is one of the areas of greatest weakness, where more out of the box thinking is required. 
The role of hunches, informal reasoning, anomalies, and qualitative evidence in discovery of 
causal mechanisms is well documented – see Freedman (2008). More effort to find qualitative 
implications  of  hypotheses  under  consideration,  and  informal  evaluations  of  these 
implications should prove rewarding. An interesting illustration of this is provided in Andrabi 
et al. (2007), who study education in Pakistan. Initial findings that parents send fewer girls to 
schools  suggest  discriminatory  behavior.  However,  closer  investigation  shows  that  the Zaman-Causal Relations via Econometrics  
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“distance to school” is a key factor for the schooling decision for girls (and not so much for 
boys). Other data shows  that parents  invest  heavily in  schooling for children whom they 
consider bright,  without discriminating between girls  and boys.  These hypotheses  emerge 
only after expending “shoe leather,” – the authors went to the villages, and walked with the 
children to their schools. Mistakes regarding causal factor can and often do lead to wrong and 
ineffective policy prescriptions. On the ground investigations often reveal a reality at variance 
with general purpose a priori theories. Another important instance of this is furnished by 
Banerjee  and  Duflo  (2004)  who  discuss  how  to  reconcile  empirical  evidence  with  an 
aggregate production function and find it cannot be done. 
 
In addition to using more shoe leather, investigating implications of hypotheses in different 
domains both qualitatively and quantitatively, econometricians need to do more informal and 
exploratory data analysis. History and inertia plays a large role in determining the shape of 
current practice. Econometric and statistical methods were developed in a pre-computer era, 
where many types of analyses were not possible. In particular graphical and exploratory data 
analysis of the type currently routine is not part of the standard training of econometricians. 
Making boxplots, graphs of different sorts, and in general doing informal data analyses would 
add  a  lot  of  value,  and  provide  more  convincing  demonstrations  than  sophisticated 
econometric analyses in many situations. 
 
8.4. Randomized and Behavioral Experiments 
 
In  general,  randomization  has  been  a  powerful  tool  in  disentangling  causal  chains.  For 
obvious reasons, it has  not been used much in  economics. Nonetheless, it has been used 
successfully on a number of occasions in the past, and is becoming increasingly important. 
Burtless (1995), Greenberg and Shroder (2004), and many others provide strong evidence on 
the value of randomized experiments in providing evidence on genuine causal mechanisms. 
The Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab, started in 2003 by Professors Banerjee, Duflo, 
and  Mullainathan  of  MIT  uses  randomized  experiments  as  basis  for  evaluating  the 
effectiveness of poverty programs. Heckman, Lalonde and Smith (1999) discuss econometric 
evaluations of experiments in labor markets, which provide important evidence regarding the 
effects of policies.  
 
Direct experimentation and data gathering unconstrained by theory and complex models has 
often led to substantial gains in understanding. Experiments by behavioral economists have 
led to many new insights and theoretical developments; see for example, Kahnemann (2003), 
and Barberis and Thaler (2003). Experimental evidence suggests that people increase efforts 
in response to wage increases, in conflict with neoclassical economic theory; see Falk and 
Fehr (2003). Andrabi et al. (2007) provide observational evidence, which shows that fourfold 
increase in teachers‟ wages does not lead to improved educational outcomes in rural schools 
in  Pakistan. The point  I am  trying to make here is  that because  causality is  not  directly 
observable, establishing causality requires piecing together evidence from different sources, 
and  out  of  the  box  reasoning.  Experimental  and  qualitative  evidence  provides  strong 
supporting evidence, but no single piece of evidence may be conclusive. 
 
 





Although  there  are  many  causes  for  the  current  confusions  regarding  causality  in 
econometrics, my feeling is the over-specialization is at the heart of the matter. Julie Reuben 
(1996:176) writes that: 
 
Academic  scientists  coming  of  age  in  the  early  twentieth  century  rejected  the 
utopian vision of science and the ideal  of the unity of truth  that had been so 
important to their predecessors. They embraced specialization and rejected efforts 
to synthesize all knowledge. They began to see the interests of their disciplines in 
a  model  of  science  that  …  associated  objectivity  with  the  rejection  of  moral 
values.  …  (They  defined  their  role  as)  producing  research  and  providing 
specialized training. This more limited role gave scientists more autonomy and 
freedom from administrative supervision.  
 
Increasing  specialization  has  led  to  the  fragmentation  of  knowledge  and  a  loss  of  vision 
regarding the grand enterprise of accumulation of knowledge to serve the humankind as a 
whole. Vartan Gregorian (1993), the president of Brown University, discusses many of the 
problems created by this fragmentation: 
 
Specialization,  instead  of  uniting  human  beings  into  a  general  community  of 
values  and  discourse,  has  by  necessity  divided  them  into  small  and  exclusive 
coteries, narrow in outlook and interest. It isolates and alienates human beings. 
Social relations, as a result, cease to be the expression of common perceptions and 
common  beliefs;  they  are  reduced  to  political  relations,  to  the  interplay  of 
competitive,  and  often  antagonistic,  groups.  Specialized  education  makes  our 
students into instruments to serve the specialized needs of a society of specialists.  
 
In particular, the distinction between applied and theoretical work and specialization in this 
way has been very damaging. Theoreticians work on problems chosen for their mathematical 
structure, with no knowledge or awareness of, or even interest in, potential for applications. 
As a  result, a massive  amount of brainpower is  brought  to  bear on  problems,  which  are 
completely trivial when viewed in the perspective of problems, which currently threaten the 
future of mankind. At the same time, very little thought and effort goes into solving complex 
multidisciplinary problems of genuine importance. More efforts towards a holistic approach 
will prove rewarding. Encouraging authors to assess the relevance of their research towards 
solving genuine problems, and engaging more with the real world would create the motivation 
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